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Relations between Türkiye and Latin America


by Martin Aslan

Türkiye has established a real presence in regions such as Africa, especially in Libya and Somalia, as well as in Central Asia. Yet, one part of the world remains relatively under the radar in Turkish foreign policy: Latin America. Despite the geographical distance, it seems Ankara has been quietly working to expand its defense footprint in the region.

Interestingly, the roots of Türkiye’s connection to Latin America stretch back to the 19th century, when immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, mostly Arabs, settled in South America. Locals called them "Los Turcos" (The Turks), a nickname that still stucks despite their actual ethnic origins.


High-level visits and diplomatic expansion

Türkiye launched an “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” in 1998. It was revised in 2006, when Türkiye declared that year as the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”. The plan served as a formal roadmap for engaging more seriously in the region.

The first Turkish presidential visit to Latin America happened in 1995, covering Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. President R. T. Erdoğan also visited Mexico, Colombia, and Cuba in 2015, followed by Chile, Peru, and Ecuador in 2016. Moreover, the foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico in 2017. It clearly demonstrates that Ankara started being really interested in the region after 2015. 

Türkiye has embassies in most major South American countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Several of these nations, like Brazil and Argentina, also have embassies in Ankara as well.

During the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, Türkiye hosted a conference on “regional perspectives from Latin America and the Carribean” with the vice ministers of foreign affairs from Panama and Guatemala. However, the only other  South-American official was the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Cuba. It reflects a lack of interest from South American countries in engaging with Türkiye.


Political, economic and cultural relations

Relations with Brazil and Mexico have been upgraded to strategic partnerships (in 2010 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Brazil and signed the Action Plan for Strategic Partnership; in 2013, during a visit by then-Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto to Türkiye both countries agreed to strengthen bilateral ties through a strategic cooperation framework). Türkiye has also established political consultation mechanisms with 17 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Brazil is Türkiye’s largest trading partner in the region, followed by Argentina and Chile. Although Free Trade Agreement talks with MERCOSUR are ongoing, progress has been slow. Trade volume with the region topped $9.2 billion in 2017.

Turkish Airlines flies to a select group of cities like Cancún, Panama City, Bogotá, Caracas, Havana, Santiago, Buenos Aires or São Paulo, but the reach is still modest. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s soft power has gained traction: Turkish series are popular, and institutions like TIKA and the Yunus Emre Institute operate across the region.


Defense cooperation: emerging but expanding

Ankara is steadily deepening its defense ties across Latin America, reflecting a growing ambition to diversify partnerships and boost its global defense industry presence. These efforts showcase a strategic shift, not only to enhance bilateral ties but also to project Turkish defense capabilities beyond its traditional spheres of influence. Three main countries appear to be clearly targeted, though it is difficult to know in cases like Cuba, Venezuela or Mexico, since nothing seems to have emerged.

Brazil:

    • In 2024, Brazil and Türkiye held a Defense Industry Dialogue to build on discussions that started in 2019.

    • In 2025, Turkish Aerospace and Embraer signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to explore aviation R&D and potential cooperation.

Argentina:

    • In 2021, TAI and Argentina’s INVAP formed GSATCOM and signed Türkiye’s first satellite export deal: the ARSAT-SG1. This project strengthens bilateral ties but also positions both countries as emerging players in the global satellite industry. 

    • In 2022, Turkish company TITRA partnered with Argentina’s Cicare on helicopter tech.

    • In 2023, Türkiye offered its ANKA drone system to Buenos Aires.

    • In 2025, Aselsan has proposed a modernization package for Argentina’s MEKO 360-class frigates, building on its experience upgrading MEKO 200-class ships for the Turkish Navy.

Chile:

    • In 2023, Aselsan won a contract to modernize Chile’s Leopard 2A4 tanks.

    • In 2024, Aselsan opened a Latin American office in Santiago to boost defense partnerships. According to the company, it “will make a great contribution to Aselsan’s long-term potential cooperation in Latin America”.

    • In 2025, Turkish defence firm Havelsan signed a deal to upgrade two Chilean Navy frigates with its Advent combat management system.

Moreover, beyond the challenges facing the DTIB, Turkish security personnel have contributed to UN missions in Haiti (MINUSTAH/MINUJUSTH) to support stability and security in the country.

Ankara is working to build stronger political, economic, and defense ties with countries across South and Central America. Though Türkiye's economic and defense footprint remains modest, significant progress has been made with strategic partnerships, and a focus on defense cooperation, as evidenced by joint ventures in satellite technology, drones, or military modernization projects. While Turkish influence in Latin America is still developing, its ambition to become a more prominent global player is evident, positioning Ankara as an emerging partner for countries in this region.

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