by Martin Aslan Both Erdoğan’s government and the Iranian regime perceive the Kurds as a threat. Estimates place their population between 7 and 15 million in Iran, Iranian Kurds—known as Rojhelati or Eastern Kurds—have faced ongoing discrimination, including restrictions on Kurdish language education, cultural expression, and political organizing. On February 22, 2026, five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) to coordinate efforts against the Islamic Republic. A sixth group, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, joined on March 4. The coalition includes: Such political coordination among Iranian Kurdish movements is likely to be closely watched in Ankara, where Kurdish political and territorial developments beyond Türkiye’s borders are viewed through a national security lens. If Iranian Kurdish parties were to gain territorial control in Iranian Kurdistan, it would likely heighten concerns in Ankara. Türkiye ha...
by Derya Vogel When the Saudi-Emirati rift over Yemen erupted into open conflict in late December 2025, Turkish pro-government voices could scarcely contain their delight. Commentators gleefully branded the UAE a reckless destabilizer, hurling accusations of covert Israeli collusion to fragment Arab states. They portrayed Abu Dhabi as isolated and humiliated, while touting Turkiye's "strategic depth" as ideally positioned to capitalize on the chaos. This was the classic Erdoğan media playbook: converting rivals' crises into Ankara's supposed victories. Official Ankara, however, played a cooler hand. The Foreign Ministry's measured December 26 statement praised both sides' "initiatives" for stability, pointedly highlighting Saudi "prudence" while sidestepping direct criticism of the UAE. This restraint preserved the fragile post-2021 economic thaw with Abu Dhabi—booming trade, high-level visits—despite the vitriol from aligned pundits...