Tũrkish Pulse

by Martin Aslan Democracy is deeply rooted in Armenia and has a long history. The current Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was one of the key architects of a political shift towards the West and the search for new partners, driven in particular by a desire to break free from Russia, which has historically tried to maintain a strong influence since 1991. Russia has lost its grip on the South Caucasus in recent years. Whilst Azerbaijan is increasingly proving to be a rival to Russia and Georgia has been caught up in a pro-European momentum for several years, Armenia constituted Moscow’s last foothold in what was considered its own backyard. Russia senses the tide turning and fears the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections to be held on 7 June.  Whilst Armenia is already facing disinformation campaigns, and political and economic pressure from Russia, which is seeking to sway Armenian public opinion in favor of pro-Russian candidates, the polls indicate that the incumbent Pr...

by Martin Aslan In the volatile geopolitics of March 2026, Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains the region's most destabilizing force—master of loud moral outrage and quiet strategic opportunism. The Azerbaijan-Israel axis perfectly exposes Ankara's hypocrisy. Azerbaijan supplies Israel with roughly 46% of its crude oil imports, flowing through Turkey's Ceyhan port via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In return, Israeli drones and advanced weaponry helped Baku decisively defeat Armenia in recent conflicts. This partnership directly counters Iran, providing Israel intelligence access near Tehran's borders and stoking fears of unrest among Iran's large ethnic Azeri population. Turkey vociferously backs Azerbaijan as “one nation, two states,” supplying political cover and military aid. Simultaneously, Erdoğan unleashes blistering anti-Israel rhetoric—especially over Gaza—imposing partial trade bans to rally domestic and Islamic support. Yet reality betrays the bl...

by Martin Aslan Both Erdoğan’s government and the Iranian regime perceive the Kurds as a threat. Estimates place their population between 7 and 15 million in Iran, Iranian Kurds—known as Rojhelati or Eastern Kurds—have faced ongoing discrimination, including restrictions on Kurdish language education, cultural expression, and political organizing. On February 22, 2026, five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) to coordinate efforts against the Islamic Republic. A sixth group, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, joined on March 4. The coalition includes: Such political coordination among Iranian Kurdish movements is likely to be closely watched in Ankara, where Kurdish political and territorial developments beyond Türkiye’s borders are viewed through a national security lens. If Iranian Kurdish parties were to gain territorial control in Iranian Kurdistan, it would likely heighten concerns in Ankara. Türkiye ha...

  by  Derya Vogel When the Saudi-Emirati rift over Yemen erupted into open conflict in late December 2025, Turkish pro-government voices could scarcely contain their delight. Commentators gleefully branded the UAE a reckless destabilizer, hurling accusations of covert Israeli collusion to fragment Arab states. They portrayed Abu Dhabi as isolated and humiliated, while touting Turkiye's "strategic depth" as ideally positioned to capitalize on the chaos. This was the classic Erdoğan media playbook: converting rivals' crises into Ankara's supposed victories. Official Ankara, however, played a cooler hand. The Foreign Ministry's measured December 26 statement praised both sides' "initiatives" for stability, pointedly highlighting Saudi "prudence" while sidestepping direct criticism of the UAE. This restraint preserved the fragile post-2021 economic thaw with Abu Dhabi—booming trade, high-level visits—despite the vitriol from aligned pundits...

by Martin Aslan Türkiye’s relationship with Asia is a dynamic blend of cultural, religious, and economic ties shaping Türkiye’s foreign policy and regional influence. These multifaceted connections reveal how cultural and religious bonds intersect with Türkiye’s paradoxical roles as both a peacemaker and arms supplier and raises questions about its real commitment in fighting fitna (division) within the Muslim world. This ambiguous position also raises questions about the effectiveness of Ankara’s influence. Cultural and religious connections Asia has long held historical and cultural importance for Türkiye. The Turkish people originally migrated from regions around present-day Mongolia, a heritage President Erdogan often recalls. This historical memory partly explains Türkiye’s continuing interest in the Uyghur people of China. While Ankara occasionally criticizes Beijing’s repression of Uyghurs, it offers little tangible support. Türkiye’s cultural resonance extends to South Asia, pa...

by Martin Aslan After decades of conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish government, a political “black swan” emerged in early 2025. Jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan issued a historic call for disarmament and the dissolution of the group. In March 2025, following Öcalan’s appeal, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire with Türkiye. On May 12, it officially announced its intention to disband and end its armed struggle. In July, thirty PKK militants symbolically destroyed their weapons in a ceremony in northern Iraq — a remarkable gesture after forty years of insurgency against Türkiye. Yet the question remains: does this moment mark the beginning of a genuine new era of peace between Turks and Kurds, particularly in Iraq, or is only the illusion of a reconciliation? No sign of peace from Türkiye Despite Öcalan’s call, Ankara has taken no reciprocal steps. The PKK founder remains imprisoned, serving a life sentence after 26 years behind bars. His continued d...