Skip to main content

Wheat from Ukraine: Looting as a policy


by Martin Aslan


In a country suffering from war, all exports are restricted in order to cover the needs of the population. In Ukraine, shortages of wheat and gas have been identified. Therefore, it is crucial to control the flows of such goods in order to protect the population. 

It seems that the authorities are not able to completely restrict exports. On May 24 reports from the Luhasnk Oblast indicated that people in the town of Stanytsia Luhanska have complained about the lack of fuel at gas stations and about Russian substandard food.

It appears that Russia is taking advantage of the situation by organizing the export of the goods urgently needed by civilians. This could be regarded as starvation as a method of warfare. Using starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited by the Geneva Convention (1977 additional protocols) as well as by the Russian Federation’s Military Manual.

Grain is first moved to the ports of Crimea (Kerch, Sevastopol, Feodosia), occupied by Russia. There, the grains are loaded on dry cargo ships. Based on the size and number of ships departing from Crimea, it seems the quantity exported is very important. On May 21 alone, 2 large ships have departed from Crimea. On May 23 an additional vessel left Crimea.

The destination of many vessels is Syria. This could mean that Russia is trying to support its Syrian ally and guarantee stability there, to the detriment of the Ukrainian population.

Below, you can see the pictures of the vessels exporting wheat out of Ukraine. I received these pictures from a personal contact located in Ukraine. I will try to get more first-hand information on what is happening there in the near future and offer analysis for my readers.

The dry cargo ship “Mikhail Nenashev”, departed on May 21. The vessel returns to Sevastopol after the delivery of grain to a Syrian port.


The dry cargo “Souria” left on May 21. The vessel makes a return voyage to the port of Feodosia after delivery to the port of Iskanderun (Turkiye).


The dry cargo ship “Matros Pozynich” departed on May 23 and headed for Syria to deliver grain there.



Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Relations between Türkiye and Latin America

by Martin Aslan Türkiye has established a real presence in regions such as Africa, especially in Libya and Somalia, as well as in Central Asia. Yet, one part of the world remains relatively under the radar in Turkish foreign policy: Latin America. Despite the geographical distance, it seems Ankara has been quietly working to expand its defense footprint in the region. Interestingly, the roots of Türkiye’s connection to Latin America stretch back to the 19th century, when immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, mostly Arabs, settled in South America. Locals called them "Los Turcos" (The Turks), a nickname that still stucks despite their actual ethnic origins. High-level visits and diplomatic expansion Türkiye launched an “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” in 1998. It was revised in 2006, when Türkiye declared that year as the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”. The plan served as a formal roadmap for engaging more seriously in the region. The first Turkish pr...

Türkish influence in Asia: promoter of peace or supplier of weapons?

by Martin Aslan Türkiye’s relationship with Asia is a dynamic blend of cultural, religious, and economic ties shaping Türkiye’s foreign policy and regional influence. These multifaceted connections reveal how cultural and religious bonds intersect with Türkiye’s paradoxical roles as both a peacemaker and arms supplier and raises questions about its real commitment in fighting fitna (division) within the Muslim world. This ambiguous position also raises questions about the effectiveness of Ankara’s influence. Cultural and religious connections Asia has long held historical and cultural importance for Türkiye. The Turkish people originally migrated from regions around present-day Mongolia, a heritage President Erdogan often recalls. This historical memory partly explains Türkiye’s continuing interest in the Uyghur people of China. While Ankara occasionally criticizes Beijing’s repression of Uyghurs, it offers little tangible support. Türkiye’s cultural resonance extends to South Asia, pa...

Turkish concerns mount as Iranian Kurdish Coalition rises

by Martin Aslan Both Erdoğan’s government and the Iranian regime perceive the Kurds as a threat. Estimates place their population between 7 and 15 million in Iran, Iranian Kurds—known as Rojhelati or Eastern Kurds—have faced ongoing discrimination, including restrictions on Kurdish language education, cultural expression, and political organizing. On February 22, 2026, five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) to coordinate efforts against the Islamic Republic. A sixth group, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, joined on March 4. The coalition includes: Such political coordination among Iranian Kurdish movements is likely to be closely watched in Ankara, where Kurdish political and territorial developments beyond Türkiye’s borders are viewed through a national security lens. If Iranian Kurdish parties were to gain territorial control in Iranian Kurdistan, it would likely heighten concerns in Ankara. Türkiye ha...