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The Reasons for Turkish Intervention in Syria


by Martin Aslan


A new attack in Türkiye has triggered a fourth Turkish military intervention in Syria. The consequences of this new Turkish military operation could further deteriorate the social and security situation in the region. Syria is gradually losing control of its sovereignty to third countries such as Russia and Türkiye.

On 13 November, another attack hit Istanbul on the busy Istiklal Avenue. This cowardly act left six people dead and 81 injured. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan immediately promised that those responsible for this vile attack would be unmasked and punished. A few hours later, one person was arrested. Although the presumed perpetrator of this attack was of Syrian nationality, the Turkish authorities were quick to accuse the PYD1 and the PKK. The day after the attack, 46 people were arrested. This event comes at a time when Türkiye is doing everything it can to launch a new military operation in northern Syria against Kurdish groups affiliated with the PYD. Indeed, the attack is seen by some as a pretext for launching Operation Claw-Sword on 20 November 2022.

This fourth operation will have dramatic consequences for the future of Syria and the Syrian people. Bombardments hit the Al-Hol camp held by the FDS2, grain silos near Al-Malikiyah, and a power station. Combined with the policy of draining the Euphrates, the situation is a social and security time bomb for Syria. While the targets Türkiye is dealing with run counter to the Geneva Conventions, these actions are all the more unacceptable as they interfere with the fight against al-Qaeda and Islamic State terrorist groups. Moreover, like the Turkish interventions in northern Iraq, these actions violate Syria's territorial sovereignty.

The Turkish intervention is undoubtedly supported by Iran, which has launched a similar operation in northern Iraq against Iranian Kurdish groups. Negotiations are also underway with Russia, which nevertheless wants the Turkish military operation to be limited. Türkiye’s desire to create a 30 km corridor3 along the Syrian-Turkish border is one of President Erdoğan's priorities. This buffer zone is the result of an agreement signed in 2019 between Ankara and Moscow. By allowing Türkiye to intervene in Syria, Russia and Iran appear to be managing matters of sovereignty instead of the Syrian state. Under Russian pressure, Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may eventually find common ground, and Damascus and Ankara may once again become partners4 to put an end to the Kurdish presence.


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1 Kurdish group considered by Turkiye to be an offshoot of the PKK in Syria.

2 Syrian Democratic Focrces

3 On Syrian territory

4 Before the start of the conflict in 2011, Damascus and Ankara were political and economic partners.

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