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International relations surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict



by Martin Aslan

The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is a country not recognised by the international community. It has been in conflict with Azerbaijan since the end of the Soviet era. Relations between the players in this conflict are complex and sometimes inconsistent. Türkiye, Russia and Iran contribute to complicate the situation: Türkiye supports Azerbaijan, which is close to Israel; Iran supports Christian Armenia; Russia keeps relations of opportunity with all these players. Economic interest seems to be the common link for all of them whereas ideological, religious or historical relations are not. 

The origins of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh was an oblast attached to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia. Following tensions between Russia and Armenia, the region was allocated to Azerbaijan in 1923. In 1991, following the end of the Soviet era, the republics under Moscow's tutelage gained their independence. Nagorno-Karabakh, with its predominantly Armenian population, revolted against Azerbaijan to form a self-proclaimed republic. The tensions surrounding this region are set to escalate into armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in October 2020. This conflict is fuelled by arms sales from the Hebrew state. Israel was Azerbaijan's leading arms supplier between 2017 and 2019, with a budget in excess of 375 million dollars.


The Israeli position

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Israel was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. Since then, the two countries have maintained diplomatic relations. Israel opened its embassy in 1993 and Baku in 2022. The Hebrew state imports 40% of its gas from Azerbaijan and exports arms. While many Azerbaijanis sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians, Israel's role in supporting Baku in its conflict with Armenia is widely appreciated.



The Turkish position

Türkiye maintains excellent relations with Azerbaijan. The two countries share similar languages and cultures, but also a common enemy: Armenia. Türkiye is providing Azerbaijan with particular support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Bayraktar TB2 drones have been sold for the benefit of Azebaidjan. 70% of Armenian targets have been destroyed by Bayraktar TB2 drones. Relations between Azerbaijan and the Hebrew State did not provoke any reaction from Ankara despite the events between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Armenians's exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh does not impact the authorities in Ankara. Türkiye, which is opposed to the emancipation of Armenia, is turning a blind eye to this situation. This shows the inconsistency of its bilateral relations.


Azeri PR presents Selcuk Bayraktar with a medal


Selcuk Bayraktar takes part in a pro-Palestine demonstration


The Iranian position

Azerbaijan and Iran share the same religion. Although Azerbaijan is a secular state, 94% of its population is Shiite. However, this is not bringing the two states closer together. Azerbaijan's links with Israel and United States explain the currents tensions with Iran. Iran has also stand with Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, Türkiye and Iran share PKK as a common enemy. However, Tehran kept its distance from Ankara because of the Turkish support to Baku. In particular, Iran criticizes Türkiye for transporting Azerbaijani oil to Israel via the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This is probably the reason why Ibrahim Raissi cancelled his meeting with Reçep Tayip Erdoğan on 28 November 2023.


The Russian position


After the new Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pachinian came to power, Russia gradually redirected its support towards Azerbaijan. Nikol Pachinian is not aligned with the Kremlin. The understanding between Moscow and Baku has also been strengthened by the war in Ukraine. Russia needs Azerbaijan to support its invasion, but also to escape sanctions and sell its gas, which passes through Azerbaijani territory. These factors have contributed to the gradual abandonment of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh's people. This positioning is different of Iran which has announced the acquisition of military equipment such as Su-35 multi-role fighters and Mi-28 attack helicopters.


The positions adopted by Türkiye, Russia and Iran in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia are not coherent. The plays of these countries are done at the detriment of minorities such as the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Palestinians. The economic interests of each player seem to take priority over the resolution of regional conflicts (Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine). Iran is, however, the nation that is most faithful to its opinions and displays a certain form of integrity.

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