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What Turkiye Wants in Syria

by Martin Aslan



Turkiye conducted an airstrike against Kurds in Iraq and northern Syria in February. According to the Minister of Defense, the goal was to protect the Turkish people from extremists and terrorists. One can wonder whether this was the only reason or if there is more behind it.


Do Kurds Represent a Danger for Turkiye?

In part, but Turkiye likely instrumentalizes the confrontation with Kurds abroad to pursue other objectives. The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) is banned in Turkiye and is also recognized as a terrorist group by the US and the EU. Still, the Turkish state and the PKK have clashed repeatedly since 1984 – and it would be incorrect to reduce this confrontation to terrorism. In Syria and Iraq, there are also Kurds who seek independence or autonomy. In Syria, the Kurds are represented by the YPG militia, which protects their territory. In Iraq, the autonomous region of Kurdistan has its own branch of the army: the Peshmerga. The official position of the YPG, as well as that of the Peshmerga, is completely clear: They are only responsible for the Kurds in their own country and are not concerned with what happens in Turkiye. The YPG regards itself as completely separate from the PKK and independent. They claim to protect only the rights and interests of Kurds in Syria and not those of Turkish Kurds.

As such, the argument that Kurds in foreign countries pose a danger to Turkiye seems entirely artificial. Yes, the PKK uses terrorist methods. Indeed, there are surely contacts between Kurds in Turkiye and those abroad. However, they remain two different groups with cultural differences, which result in different interests and expectations for the future.

If, in the future, the YPG and the PYD, the party affiliated with this militia, succeed in establishing a state with a high degree of autonomy, would this represent a danger for Turkiye? It is conceivable that such a state could support the PKK to some extent. However, it is more likely that a Kurdish state in Syria would seek good relations with its powerful Turkish neighbor, as the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq already does. There is no reason why a Kurdish region in Syria would be different from the Kurdish region in Iraq and not have good relations with Turkiye.


Does Turkiye Have Other Objectives in Syria?

Yes, definitely. One could argue that the Kurds are merely a pretext for Turkiye to act militarily in the region. With the operation “Source of Peace,” Turkiye established a so-called “safe zone” on Syrian territory. This refers to a 30 km-wide strip of land along the Turkish border, controlled by Turkiye. This zone is intended for the forced resettlement of millions of Syrian immigrants. Turkiye massively infringes on the rights of refugees, and there are even numerous reports of torture.

The actual issue is political: Erdogan needs a scapegoat and has chosen the Kurds for this role. His economic policies have significantly harmed Turkiye, and his party has lost popularity. A simple solution is to blame migrants, portraying them as responsible for the high unemployment rate. The operation in Syria presents an opportunity for Erdogan to demonstrate that he is fighting for his people—against terrorists and against migrants.


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