Skip to main content

Causes, reactions and consequences of the ceasefire between the PKK and Türkiye


by Marin Aslan


On Thursday, February 27, 2025, after 26 years in prison, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), officially called on the group to disband and lay down its arms.


Causes


The reasons behind Öcalan’s call for a ceasefire may be multiple. He may believe that the fight against the political regime should not rely on military attacks but should instead be pursued through political means. Additionally, he might seek to distance himself from the label of a terrorist leader and instead be seen as a defender of peace for his people, adapting to current realities to promote reconciliation.

For the Turkish president, it may be a strategic move to amend the constitution, enabling him to stand for a re-election. Indeed, he needed the opposition's support, particularly from the Peoples’ Emancipation and Democracy Party (DEM party), to change it. And a constitutional change can only be submitted to a referendum if it receives the support of 360 members of Parliament in the 600-seat chamber. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its allies currently hold 321 seats, while the DEM party has 57.

Moreover, this could also serve as a divide-and-conquer strategy. While some Kurds may support it, seeing it as a step forward, others may oppose it, preferring to continue the armed struggle to defend their rights and fight for a Kurdish state. As a result, the Kurdish community could grow 

In terms of international relations, it could be a strategy to pressure the integration of the People's Defense Units (YPG) in Syria into the new official Syrian army by undermining the legitimacy of their military actions. It would also allow the influence of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Ahmed Al-Sharaa to increase.


Reactions


The extent of Öcalan’s direct influence over the PKK could be debatable. While he remains an important symbolic figure, much of the organization's armed leadership may operate independently from him, particularly in the Qandil Mountains of Iraq, where the PKK's command structure is based. Over the years, factions within the PKK have probably developed their own political and military strategies, making it uncertain whether his call for disarmament will be fully heeded. Some within the PKK may view this as a pragmatic shift, while others may see it as a betrayal of their cause, leading to potential fractures within the organization.

Consequently, Öcalan's statement appears to have been well received within Kurdish communities across the region, offering renewed hope. However, while optimistic, some Kurds in Türkiye remain uncertain about the Turkish government's intentions. Past actions, such as the heavy crackdown on Kurdish political parties and activists, as well as ongoing human rights concerns, have contributed to skepticism.

Some commentators suggest that Erdoğan’s move may be driven by political calculation which can be risky. Indeed the most nationalist factions within the AKP or allies, such as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), may oppose any rapprochement with Kurdish political parties, fearing that it could alienate their base. Whereas Erdoğan is pushing for constitutional changes and potential re-election and, this ceasefire may also complicate his ability to balance these opposing political pressures.

This call not only echoed in Türkiye,. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are supporting peace between the Kurds and Türkiye, but this does not seem to affect its involvement in Syria. This could create tensions with Turkish authorities, who might expect PKK-affiliated groups to lay down their arms -even if they continue their fight against other non-Turkish actors in the region, such as in Syria. Ankara may view the SDF’s actions as contradictory to their peace efforts, potentially undermining the ceasefire's broader goals.

Meanwhile, officials in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region have welcomed Öcalan’s statement, hoping the peace process could represent a step toward closer ties between the Kurdish people and Türkiye. However, the evolving situation in Syria and Iraq could still complicate this dynamic, especially as Kurdish groups there, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, keep operating with significant autonomy. Any peace process between Türkiye and the Kurds could influence these groups’ relations with Ankara and regional actors.


Potential consequences


If the ceasefire succeeds, it will enhance Ankara’s image as a democracy. Therefore, it must be cautious not to imprison Kurds solely for their political beliefs and should release S. Demirtaş (the former HDP leader, now called DEM party) sentenced to 42 years in prison, and other Kurds detained for their public stance.

A success could also influence Kurds in Syria or Iraq. If the Democratic Union Party (PYD) accepts the ceasefire, it may solidify its position as the sole official Kurdish actor in the country. Consequently, Ankara won’t have legitimacy to intervene in northern Iraq and Syria where, according to Turkish armed forces “Since Jan. 1, the total number [of neutralized terrorists from SDF or ISIS] has risen to 452, including 186 in northern Iraq and 266 in northern Syria.”

However, if the Kurdish population opposes the ceasefire, Ankara’s response could become more repressive, intensifying its actions against “terrorists” weither in Türkiye or outside.


Conclusion


After Öcalan’s statement, Ankara has yet to outline clear objectives regarding the Kurdish issue. Even if the PPK agrees to lay down their arms for good could that truly lead to a lasting improvement in Kurdish rights? As a result, many are questioning how the peace process will unfold and are awaiting concrete gestures from the Turkish government.

Labels:

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Relations between Türkiye and Latin America

by Martin Aslan Türkiye has established a real presence in regions such as Africa, especially in Libya and Somalia, as well as in Central Asia. Yet, one part of the world remains relatively under the radar in Turkish foreign policy: Latin America. Despite the geographical distance, it seems Ankara has been quietly working to expand its defense footprint in the region. Interestingly, the roots of Türkiye’s connection to Latin America stretch back to the 19th century, when immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, mostly Arabs, settled in South America. Locals called them "Los Turcos" (The Turks), a nickname that still stucks despite their actual ethnic origins. High-level visits and diplomatic expansion Türkiye launched an “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” in 1998. It was revised in 2006, when Türkiye declared that year as the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”. The plan served as a formal roadmap for engaging more seriously in the region. The first Turkish pr...
Post a Comment
Read more

Beyond Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Economic Footprint in Africa

by Martin Aslan Over the past two decades, Türkiye has undergone a significant transformation in its foreign policy, with the African continent emerging as a key strategic focus. Driven by a mix of economic ambition, diplomatic outreach, and geopolitical recalibration, Türkiye has steadily expanded its presence across Africa. This shift, which accelerated after Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2003, is reflected in the rapid increase in Turkish embassies, investment flows, and trade partnerships on the continent. While officials emphasize a “win-win” model of cooperation, critics argue that Türkiye’s engagement is guided more by resource acquisition and market access than by mutual development goals. Let’s not forget that Africa is a continent rich in natural resources, while Türkiye has very few (see the article “Africa, a continent with growing appeal”: https://turkishpulse.blogspot.com/2023/10/africa-continent-with-growing-appeal.html). This article examines the development of ...
Post a Comment
Read more

Central Asia’s Cyprus Shift: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan Defy Türkiye’s Stance

By Derya Vogel Why would Central Asian nations—key members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—publicly challenge a Turkish-backed entity in the Mediterranean? At the EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on April 3–4, 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan made a surprising move: they endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, which reject the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a breakaway state recognized only by Türkiye. These resolutions reaffirm the Republic of Cyprus as the island’s sole legal government and call on all UN members not to recognize the TRNC or support its consolidation. To understand this shift, we must look back to 1974, when Cyprus was divided following a coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists aiming for unification with Greece. Türkiye responded by intervening militarily, leading to the island’s partition. The TRNC declared independence in 1983, but has remained diplomatically isolated. Türkiye, however, has consis...
Post a Comment
Read more