by Derya
Introduction
Defeated by Catherine the Second during the Russo-Ottoman War (1769-1774), which culminated in the signing of the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, the Ottoman Empire saw Crimea fall into Russian hands. The treaty granted Russia access to the Black Sea through Crimea, while Türkiye retained its command over the Mediterranean. Yet, centuries later, the delicate balance between these two powers remains fraught with contradictions. After the Bolshevik Revolution and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the newly formed Republic of Türkiye pursued a "good neighbor" policy with Russia. But how long could such a stance endure when just last week, President Erdoğan openly declared that he does not recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea?
Türkiye’s geopolitical maneuvering has long been marked by strategic ambiguity. A NATO member since 1952, it has often tested the limits of the alliance, as seen in its controversial purchase of Russian S-400 missiles in 2019, despite objections from its Western allies. At the same time, Türkiye has fostered deep economic ties with Russia, most notably through the TurkStream pipeline, signed during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Istanbul in 2016. Operational since 2020, this project underscores Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy and its economic stakes in maintaining stable relations. However, this precarious balance was rattled on January 14, 2025, when Ukraine reportedly targeted the pipeline in a suspected drone attack, exposing the fragility of their cooperation.
Türkiye’s relationship with Russia continues to oscillate between collaboration and competition. While Ankara often positions itself as an independent power, Moscow appears to hold the upper hand, subtly reinforcing its dominance. A telling example was Russia’s decision to designate Türkiye as a mere "partner country" within BRICS, a status seemingly created just for Türkiye but falling short of full membership. Many experts view this as a calculated move, allowing Türkiye a seat at the table while simultaneously keeping its ambitions in check. Yet as tensions persist and Türkiye’s strategic duplicity becomes increasingly apparent, the question remains: how long can it balance between East and West before being forced to choose a side?
I/ Syria
Syria remains a central theater of both collaboration and opposition. Vladimir Putin has long backed Bashar al-Assad, following the narrative that Russia’s presence was aimed at defeating ISIS.
Before Assad’s fall in December 2024, and since 2015, Syria was a key Russian stronghold, with naval bases like Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase offering Moscow a vital Mediterranean foothold and a platform for regional power projection since 2015. Meanwhile, Erdoğan strengthened Türkiye’s influence by supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), linked to the PKK. Russia tacitly allowed Turkish operations, like the 2019 Peace Spring offensive, balancing their rampant rivalry with a shared interest in limiting Western influence.
The recent developments may upset this fragile equilibrium: the seizure of power by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Russia’s advanced withdrawal from Syria now throw off balance the cooperative dynamic. This turn of events has been seized as an opportunity for President Erdoğan to pursue his agenda to repress the Kurds and assert political and military dominance in the region.
As for Russia, its repositioning in Africa, consequent to their ousting from Syria, seems now both absolutely necessary to preserve their reputation, and increasingly difficult to implement. The loss of Syria has severed their primary access to the Mediterranean Sea, which is a critical logistical lifeline for projecting its influence towards the continent.
II/ Africa
A- Libya
If Türkiye has been officially present in Libya since 2019, Russia’s presence was initially limited to the paramilitary group Wagner, which, at the time, did not officially exist. Türkiye intervened militarily in January 2019 to support the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, formalizing its involvement through a security and maritime agreement. In contrast, Russia’s covert backing of Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) has begun around 2018, with Wagner mercenaries providing training, weapons, and battlefield support in eastern Libya.
This rivalry intensified in early 2025. The January 9 incident in Zawiya, a key oil-refining hub west of Tripoli, has showed clashes between GNA-aligned militias and suspected Wagner-backed LNA fighters attempting to disrupt oil exports. It resulted in 12 deaths and a temporary shutdown of the refinery. The timing of this clash, soon after Assad’s fall in December 2024, may suggest Türkiye is taking advantage of Russia’s weakened position in Syria. Meanwhile, to compensate for its lost naval base in Syria, Russia may seek to establish new facilities in Libya or Algeria, with reports indicating Moscow has pressed Haftar for docking rights in Benghazi or Tobruk.
While there are de facto conflictual relations in Libya, the bigger issue in the competition between Russia and Türkiye might be in the Sahel, where Türkiye is using Russia’s difficulties to strengthen its influence and secure a path to Africa through the Mediterranean.
B- Mali
Following the 2020 coup in Mali, the Wagner Group reportedly began collaborating with the military junta, solidifying Russia’s foothold in the country. Even after the death of its founder, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, in a plane crash, Wagner remained active, targeting both armed forces and civilians. However, Russia is not the only foreign power seeking influence in Mali.
Türkiye has been steadily expanding its presence under the guise of economic and military cooperation. The launch of Turkish Airlines’ direct flights from Istanbul to the capital signals deeper economic ties, but Türkiye’s engagement extends far beyond aviation. In November 2024, a video posted on X allegedly showed the Turkish academy Canik, part of the Samsun Yurt Savunma Group, training FAMA (Mali’s armed forces, supported by the UN), further embedding Turkish influence in the country’s security sector. Then, in January 2025, Türkiye deployed a second Air Force A400M Atlas to Niamey, reinforcing its growing military footprint in the region.
C- Chad
After France’s withdrawal from Chad in late 2024, Türkiye wasted no time in asserting itself as a dominant force. By early 2025, Türkiye had taken control of the Abéché military base in eastern Chad and deployed drones and advisors to the Faya-Largeau base in the north, near the Libyan border, directly challenging Russian ambitions. To solidify its hold, Türkiye strengthened the Chadian Air Force by supplying advanced drones, such as the Aksungur and Bayraktar TB2, while Turkish personnel trained Chadian troops in their use.
This expansion is a direct counterweight to Russia’s efforts. Moscow, through the Wagner Group, has been attempting to establish a military presence in Chad, including training Chadian rebels near the Central African Republic border in early 2023. Furthermore, Russia has sought to gain economic leverage by negotiating with Chad’s transitional government for access to gold mining concessions in the Tibesti region since mid-2024. Now, Türkiye’s swift military and economic engagements present a formidable challenge to Russia’s attempts at destabilization and resource extraction.
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D- Niger
Since the July 2023 coup in Niger, both Türkiye and Russia have aggressively competed for influence. In April 2024, Russia deployed military trainers and an air defense system to Niamey, hoping to strengthen the junta and secure access to Niger’s uranium reserves. By November 2024, Russian firms had begun investing in the country’s mining sector, further entrenching Moscow’s economic interests.
Türkiye, however, quickly countered these moves. In July 2024, a high-profile Turkish delegation visited Niger, securing deals to supply Bayraktar TB2 drones and train Nigerien forces. By October 2024, Ankara had signed a provisional pact allowing Turkish companies to explore uranium deposits, directly challenging Russia’s resource-driven strategy. While Moscow leans on military deployments and economic investments, Türkiye’s combination of drone warfare, military training, and diplomatic engagement has won favor with the junta, posing a significant threat to Russia’s ambitions in the region.
Türkiye’s expanding role in Libya, Mali, Chad, and Niger builds on decades of political, economic, and cultural influence, rooted in Ottoman ties to North Africa. Historically, the Ottoman Empire had strong political and cultural connections in the region, which Türkiye continues to leverage in its modern-day engagements. Unlike Russia’s fragmented approach, heavily reliant on the Wagner Group and opportunistic resource grabs, Türkiye presents itself as a strategic partner, using military aid, drone technology, and diplomacy to consolidate power.
III/ Ukraine
Although Türkiye did not condemn the military actions against Ukraine, President Erdoğan has expressed his eagerness to serve as a key mediator by facilitating the Black Sea grain deal with the signing ceremony held at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul in July 2022. This proposal of mediation was met with great success, and Erdoğan successfully propelled his country to the forefront of global politics. The Black Sea deal was therefore made possible thanks to the host country, Türkiye.and Russia, agreed to the deal in exchange for a lessening of the sanctions on Russian exports of food and fertilizers.
This followed Türkiye’s broader strategy of balancing its NATO membership with pragmatic ties to Russia. A little after that, Ankara decided, contrary to the rules of the Montreux Convention, to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to naval vessels from any country. This decision came amid heightened regional stakes, further underscored by Erdoğan’s statement on March 18, 2025, at the Crimea Platform Summit, marking the 11th anniversary of Crimea’s annexation, where he reiterated that Crimea’s return to Ukraine was a matter of international law. It reaffirmed Türkiye’s opposition to Russia’s 2014 takeover while carefully managing its complex relationship with Moscow.
Conclusion
Yet, beneath the surface, Türkiye’s maneuvering is no less self-serving than Russia’s. By offering military support under the banner of security cooperation, Türkiye secures lucrative economic deals and strengthens its geopolitical influence. As Ankara continues to balance between NATO obligations and independent power plays, its growing footprint in Africa raises a fundamental question: is Türkiye positioning itself as an alternative power to Russia, or merely another actor in the great game of influence and resource control?
In sum, the relationship between Türkiye and Russia sways between uneasy alliance and inevitable rivalry, shaped by centuries of historical frictions and modern geopolitical stakes. From Syria’s shifting power dynamics to fierce competition in Africa’s Sahel region, and from energy ties like TurkStream to disputes over Crimea, both nations pursue conflicting ambitions. Türkiye’s steady rise, fueled by historical ties and strategic flexibility, increasingly challenges Russia’s weakened position. The "good neighbor" policy may soon give way to outright confrontation.
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