Central Asia’s Cyprus Shift: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan Defy Türkiye’s Stance

By Derya Vogel

Why would Central Asian nations—key members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—publicly challenge a Turkish-backed entity in the Mediterranean?

At the EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on April 3–4, 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan made a surprising move: they endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, which reject the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a breakaway state recognized only by Türkiye. These resolutions reaffirm the Republic of Cyprus as the island’s sole legal government and call on all UN members not to recognize the TRNC or support its consolidation.

To understand this shift, we must look back to 1974, when Cyprus was divided following a coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists aiming for unification with Greece. Türkiye responded by intervening militarily, leading to the island’s partition. The TRNC declared independence in 1983, but has remained diplomatically isolated. Türkiye, however, has consistently pushed for broader recognition of the TRNC—particularly within the OTS, a bloc it has led since its founding in 2009 to promote unity among Turkic-speaking countries. In 2022, Türkiye even secured the TRNC’s observer status in the OTS, under its constitutional name.

Despite this longstanding effort, the recent decision by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan marks a clear break with Ankara’s narrative. Was it simply a pragmatic pivot toward the European Union—or a deeper challenge to Türkiye’s influence within the Turkic world?

I. The EU–Central Asia Summit and the Declaration

The Samarkand summit marked the first EU–Central Asia gathering of its kind. Leaders from all five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—met with top EU officials, including Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell. Talks focused on regional connectivity, energy, and governance reforms. The broader message was clear: the EU wants to offer Central Asia an alternative to dependence on Russia and China. Backing that ambition was a €12 billion investment pledge under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, with funds targeting rail networks, green hydrogen and solar projects, and digital infrastructure.

In this context, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan issued a joint declaration endorsing the UN resolutions on Cyprus. It wasn’t just symbolic—it aligned them with the EU’s legal and political stance on the issue. All three also announced plans to open embassies in Nicosia. Uzbekistan took the lead, accrediting its ambassador in December 2024; Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan followed during the summit. This marked a sharp turn from their earlier quiet sympathy toward Türkiye’s position, and reflected a growing openness to align with international norms—even at the cost of regional unity.

II. Strategic Motives and Broader Calculations

Behind this diplomatic shift is a mix of economic and strategic reasoning. For these Central Asian governments, the EU’s €12 billion pledge offers more than just financial support—it promises diversified trade routes, access to high-tech infrastructure, and a platform for longer-term development. Supporting the EU position on Cyprus may have been a small price to pay for unlocking those benefits.

The TITR or Middle Corridor could potentially be a shorter alternative to the Northern Corridor and Ocean Route. Source: © 2025 Clingendael Institute – edited by Textcetera, The Hague

At the same time, this move signals a broader balancing act. With Russia weakened and China’s influence more tightly scrutinized, many Central Asian states are eager to widen their diplomatic horizons. Aligning with the EU boosts their international standing while keeping options open beyond traditional partners like Türkiye. It also plays well domestically: defending Cyprus’s territorial integrity aligns with their own sensitivities around separatism and sovereignty—issues still raw from the Soviet collapse. Still, questions remain. Was this a well-calculated act of sovereign diplomacy—or a trade-off driven by economic incentives? And what does it mean for the future of Turkic unity?

III. Reactions and Implications

The backlash from Türkiye was immediate. Officials in Ankara denounced the move as a betrayal of Turkic brotherhood, and Northern Cyprus leaders, like Deputy Prime Minister Erhan Arıklı, called for the OTS to reconsider the observer status of the three countries. Turkish media outlets didn’t hold back either—Cumhuriyet ran the headline “They sold the TRNC for 12 billion euros,” accusing Central Asia of abandoning shared values for EU money (www.cumhuriyet.com).

Within the OTS, the fallout has been more subtle but no less serious. Azerbaijan, a close ally of Türkiye, continues to back the TRNC. But the silence from the organization’s leadership points to deeper fractures. The embassy openings in Cyprus by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan weren’t just diplomatic formalities—they were seen by many as direct challenges to Türkiye’s leadership in the bloc. The OTS now faces serious questions about its cohesion and ability to act as a unified voice on foreign policy.

In contrast, the Republic of Cyprus and the EU hailed the move as a major diplomatic win. Nicosia welcomed the embassies as a breakthrough in its decades-long effort to isolate the TRNC, while Brussels pointed to the episode as evidence that international law still matters. More broadly, it reflects a shifting trend: Central Asia is engaging more openly with Western institutions, even if it risks tensions within familiar regional alliances. Whether this signals a lasting realignment or a one-time recalibration remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The decision by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to distance themselves from Türkiye’s Cyprus stance is more than a regional diplomatic episode—it’s a revealing signal of shifting global alignments. By choosing to side with EU and UN positions, these Central Asian states are not only challenging Ankara’s influence within the Turkic world but also embracing a more multipolar foreign policy grounded in economic pragmatism and international legitimacy. And while Türkiye has taken the brunt of the backlash, the quiet loser in this shift may well be Russia. As Brussels expands its presence in Central Asia with multibillion-euro investments and deeper diplomatic ties, Moscow faces a gradual erosion of its traditional sway in the region—a reminder that the geopolitical map of Eurasia is being redrawn, one summit at a time.