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Calculated chaos: How Türkiye exploits Libya’s division for strategic gain

by Martin Aslan

Türkiye is playing a dangerous diplomatic game with its Libyan partners and places itself in the middle of a potentially explosive situation. Türkiye-backed western Libya is in the edge of internal conflict due the tensions rising between armed groups related to the Government of National Unity (GNU). Instead of resolving this problem by diplomatic means, Türkiye is moving closer to the clan of Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which had previously opposed the GNU. Ankara appears to be attempting a change of alliance. This rapprochement is all the more hazardous because Marshal Haftar's presumed successor is his own son, General Saddam Haftar, who is particularly known for embezzling funds and violating human rights. While claiming to be dealing with Libya's fundamental problems in the general interest, Türkiye is actually driven by its economic ambitions.


The benefits of a divided Libya

Since the 2011 uprising during the Arab Spring, which culminated in the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has been mired in a protracted civil war marked by political fragmentation, armed rivalries, and foreign interference. This situation has led to a de facto division of the country since 2014, with competing governments and militias controlling different regions, primarily split between east and west. Cyrenaica is led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar with the National Liberation Army and Tripolitania is led by the politician Fayez el-Sarraj with the Government of National Union.

Since then, the clashes between the two camps have emerged with the support of third countries such as Türkiye, which has supported Fayez el-Sarraj as a first choice from the beginning, and Russia, which has backed Marshal Khalifa Haftar. While Russia's presence justifies itself by the “urge” to propose an alternative to the international community, Türkiye on its behalf is using Libya's Ottoman past to explain its involvement. In this way, Türkiye and Russia are indirectly confronting each other to gain the battle of influence. In any case, none of the two is involved in the resolution of the conflict.


A civil war fueled by Türkiye and Russia

Before the fall of the regime in 2011, Türkiye had important trade relations with Muammar Gaddafi. However, with the wave initiated by the Arab Spring, the Turkish President began to distance himself from the Libyan dictator and support Fayez al-Saraj's camp. Assuming that the Government of National Unity was recognized by the UN, Türkiye sent Syrian mercenaries and arms despite the 2011 UN embargo. Officially today, Ankara says it is seeking to put an end to the civil war and allow a peaceful political transition toward a favorable long-term environment.

On the other side, Marshal Haftar is supported by Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Like Türkiye, Russia has put its private military company Wagner at work and has supplied arms. Those alliances clearly fueled the civil war by giving the two sides the means and will to fight.


A risky strategy for Turkish influence in Libya

Although political and security tensions have never subsided in Western Libya, Türkiye appears to downplay the seriousness of the current heightened instability. If the situation came to military clashes between groups, the use of Turkish drones in fratricidal fighting between armed groups affiliated to the GUN would be a red line for Ankara. The GUN Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Dabaiba, is therefore turning to Azerbaijan to obtain new tactical drones. While Türkiye could seek a solution with the GUN to prevent the situation from escalating, it is turning to the Haftar camp, essentially led by economy prospects.


Türkiye moves closer to Tobruk

Marshal Khalifa Haftar's precarious state of health is fueling speculation about his succession. There are persistent rumours of competition between Marshal Haftar's six sons. In this context, Khalifa Haftar’s youngest son, Saddam Haftar, currently seems to be the best placed to take over. Indeed, Saddam Haftar was received in Ankara last April as part of a possible military cooperation and several Libyan military delegations subsequently visited the Turkish capital (1). However, Saddam Haftar, who was appointed general by his father at the age of 33, is best known for having stolen money from the Libyan central bank, according to the United Nations, and for having committed crimes like unlawful killings, rape or torture when he commanded the Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade (2).

So, Türkiye’s move to get closer to Eastern Libya raises questions about its position and credibility, given its previous staunch support for the Tripoli-based authorities and military involvement against the East. Ankara is taking risks by cooperating with controversial individuals and seems ready to do anything for the sake of its interests, even if it means taking ambiguous and volatile positions.


Türkiye's economic interests first and foremost

Justifying its rapprochement with eastern Libya by “the unified vision of a single Libya”, the self-proclaimed “inclusive” Turkish diplomacy shows Ankara’s will to expand its influence and defend its economic interests. Indeed, the Turkish government would like to renegotiate the 2019 bilateral maritime agreement on the delimitation of Libyan and Turkish territorial waters, in order to gain access to the sectors controlled by the Haftar clan (3) Türkiye sees numerous economic opportunities for the state-owned company Turkish Petroleum (TP), which has already announced its intention to position itself in gas and oil exploration projects (4).



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