by Martin Aslan
Despite years of political clashes and stalled negotiations, Türkiye is quietly moving closer to Europe—but not in the way most might expect. What has prompted this shift, and what does it mean for both Türkiye and the European Union (EU)? The relationship between Türkiye and the EU has long been contentious, but recent developments over the past few months, suggest a shift in strategy that could reshape the future of European security and Türkiye’s role on the global stage. This article explores why Türkiye is pursuing closer ties with Europe, particularly in the area of defense industry, and what it hopes to gain from this change in approach. Indeed, this calculated rapprochement could lead European countries to become more dependent on the Turkish defense industry and, as a result, enhance Ankara’s influence over the EU.
Türkiye and the EU: a candidacy in crisis
Since Türkiye applied for EU membership in 1987 and gained official candidate status in 1999, it has struggled to meet with EU’s membership criteria. Out of the 35 chapters of the acquis communautaires, only 16 have been opened. Despite these setbacks, Ankara’s ambitions in EU have persisted, though recent years have seen mounting tensions between Türkiye and the EU. Issues like the Cyprus conflict (dating back to the 1974 Turkish invasion) and the “Mavi Vatan” maritime doctrine, which opposes Greeces’s maritime border claims in the Aegean Sea to Turkish claims, have fueled ongoing discord. Additionally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s repeated insults towards European leaders, notably French President Emmanuel Macron, have not helped matters.
As a result, Türkiye’s EU accession prospects have steadily diminished. In June 2019, the EU Council declared that negotiations with Ankara had “come to a standstill.” In September 2023, President Erdogan intensified the rhetoric, stating, “if necessary, we will part ways with the European Union,” in response to a European Parliament report criticizing Türkiye’s decline in democratic values and the rule of law.
Deepening military cooperation with EU
While the EU accession process is at a standstill, Türkiye is moving closer to Europe in one unexpected area—defense cooperation. Ankara plans to sell 45 Hurjet training aircraft to Spain, supply ships to Portugal and offshore patrole vessels to Romania. Türkiye may also succeed in selling Kaan aircraft to Madrid and TB3 to Rome. Additionally, after years of political tensions, Germany has agreed to deliver Eurofighter jets to Türkiye, overturning a previous veto related to the arrest of Istanbul's mayor.
But why is Türkiye focusing on defense cooperation, rather than pursuing full EU membership? Despite the strained political and diplomatic relationship, it seems Ankara is choosing to deepen ties with Europe in a more specific, strategic area—military technology and defense cooperation. This shift is significant because it could signal a recalibration of Türkiye’s priorities in its relationship with the EU.
In May 2025, the EU launched the “Security for Action for Europe” (SAFE) Instrument, with a €150 billion budget to support EU defense investments. This program will focus on urgent projects within the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), including drones and munitions. To qualify for funding, a minimum of 65% of the value of the acquired weapon system must be produced in an EU member state, Ukraine, or a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) — which includes EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway — or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Switzerland.
Moreover, the SAFE Instrument will allow accession countries, candidate countries, potential candidates, and countries that have signed security and defense partnerships with the EU to participate in joint procurements. Consequently, Ankara could obtain loans from the SAFE Instrument. Although Ankara did not comment on the NATO Secretary-General’s support for Türkiye's participation in SAFE, it likely concurs with it. This opens the door for further military and defense collaboration, which may offer Türkiye a chance to gain more influence within the EU, even if it’s not seeking membership.
Anchoring Ankara’s influence in the EU
These military deals, alongside collaborations under the SAFE program, reflect Türkiye’s growing soft approach to Europe in defense. It appears that Ankara is attempting to build trust with Europe step by step after years of tensions. Several questions are at stake: Does Ankara want to get closer to join the EU? Probably not. Does Ankara want to get financial help or improve its defense industry? Probably. Is this its ultimate objective? Probably not.
Türkiye’s policy is surely well planned. Indeed, it seems that the country is trying to make European countries dependent on its own defense industry. A comparison to Russia comes to mind. Until its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia was Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas, providing 40% of the EU’s natural gas supply, creating significant strategic vulnerabilities. While the context is different, Türkiye appears to be pursuing closer ties with the EU using defense as leverage. By supplying European countries with military technology and equipment, Ankara may be positioning itself as a key player in European security, thus creating dependencies that could translate into greater influence. Could Türkiye be attempting to replicate Russia’s previous leverage over Europe, but in a new domain? Time will tell.
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