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Türkish influence in Asia: promoter of peace or supplier of weapons?


by Martin Aslan

Türkiye’s relationship with Asia is a dynamic blend of cultural, religious, and economic ties shaping Türkiye’s foreign policy and regional influence. These multifaceted connections reveal how cultural and religious bonds intersect with Türkiye’s paradoxical roles as both a peacemaker and arms supplier and raises questions about its real commitment in fighting fitna (division) within the Muslim world. This ambiguous position also raises questions about the effectiveness of Ankara’s influence.


Cultural and religious connections

Asia has long held historical and cultural importance for Türkiye. The Turkish people originally migrated from regions around present-day Mongolia, a heritage President Erdogan often recalls. This historical memory partly explains Türkiye’s continuing interest in the Uyghur people of China. While Ankara occasionally criticizes Beijing’s repression of Uyghurs, it offers little tangible support.

Türkiye’s cultural resonance extends to South Asia, particularly Bangladesh. Admiration for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is evident in Kazi Nazrul Islam’s 1921 poem “Kamal Pasha”: “Kemal, what a wonder you’ve worked”. Such cultural admiration may partly explain the recent strengthening of military cooperation between the two countries. In this sense, cultural connections appear to reinforce Türkiye’s growing defense relationships.

Shared religion also plays a significant role. Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh share deep ties with Türkiye through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), where Türkiye remains an active member. The OIC serves as a platform for both dialogue and influence, reinforcing Ankara’s image as a natural leader of the Muslim world.


Economic and strategic interests

Türkiye has built strong relations with many Asian nations that have experienced rapid economic growth in the 21st century. In August 2019, Ankara launched the “Asia Anew Initiative” to deepen engagement across the continent. Moreover, Türkiye elevated its relations to the level of strategic partnership with six key countries: China, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore.

For example, diplomatic relations between Türkiye and China have developed steadily. President Erdogan visited China in July 2019, and their two countries signed multiple agreements expanding strategic cooperation. In 2015 a Chinese consortium led by COSCO acquired ~65% of the Kumport terminal in Istanbul, which Ankara cites as part of its link to China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Although Türkiye often emphasizes its support for the BRI, its actual share of China’s investment flows is relatively limited.

Türkiye also cooperates with regional organizations. Ankara was granted Sectoral Dialogue Partner status with ASEAN in 2017, and its ambassador in Jakarta is accredited to ASEAN. In 2022, Türkiye also announced its interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but there has been no progress since.

In parallel, economic and transportation links are also growing. Turkish Airlines now serves many major Asian cities — including Jakarta, Karachi, Beijing, Shanghai, New Delhi, Mumbai, Lahore, Tokyo, Ho Chi Minh City, Islamabad, Manila, Osaka, Singapore, or Bangkok — strengthening business exchanges.

Nevertheless, Türkiye’s position in Asia remains somewhat ambiguous, limiting its influence. While it benefits from the region’s economic dynamism, Ankara seeks to distinguish itself from “Global South” countries. Moreover, Türkiye faces significant economic challenges. In March 2025, the country’s annual inflation stood at around 38.1%, and the unemployment rate is projected to hover around 8.8%. These figures illustrate a fragile economic balance: it continues to struggle with high inflation, a weak currency, and limited investor confidence. Consequently, even if Ankara aims to be considered equal to—or even ahead of—other Asian countries, its domestic economic constraints are limiting its ability to act as a fully developed economic power and weakens its economic credibility.

Moreover, its role as an arms supplier further undermines its influence in the region and can be considered as a promotion of fitna.


Ankara’s paradox: Promoting peace, selling weapons

In Islamic tradition, fitna refers to division or discord within the Muslim community — something Türkiye claims to oppose. Ankara has often sought to present itself as the leader of the Muslim religion and a peacemaker in Asia. It, so, has involved in process aiming at resolve conflicts between Muslim countries in the sub-region: 

    • Supporting the Mindanao peace process between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) through the OIC in the 2010s;

    • Providing humanitarian assistance to Rohingya Muslims in 2017–2018;

    • Condemning China’s treatment of Uyghurs in 2019;

    • Mediating a ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan in October 2025.

Yet, these diplomatic efforts contrast sharply with Türkiye’s growing defense exports in Asia:

    • In 2021, the former President of Pakistan attended the launch of the first MİLGEM-class corvette built by Türkiye for the Pakistani Navy. Furthermore, in October 2025, tests on the second ship of Pakistan’s MİLGEM project appeared to have been completed.

    • Indonesia’s purchase of 12 ANKA drones in February 2023 and 48 KAAN fighter jets in July 2025;

    • Malaysia acquired 3 ANKA drones to enhance its maritime defense in May 2023;

    • Bangladesh are reportedly close to finalizing a major deal involving the SİPER long-range air defense system and potential joint drone production in October 2025.

These defense sales highlight Türkiye’s dual objectives: promoting peace diplomatically while expanding its military footprint across Asia — a contradiction that raises doubts about whether Ankara is truly fighting fitna or deepening it. 

Ultimately, Türkiye’s influence in Asia remains constrained. Cultural and religious ties offer soft power advantages, but persistent economic fragility and its growing role as an arms supplier undermine its credibility and risk perpetuating the very divisions it claims to oppose.

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