Skip to main content

Türkiye–PKK: new era or illusion of peace?

by Martin Aslan

After decades of conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish government, a political “black swan” emerged in early 2025. Jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan issued a historic call for disarmament and the dissolution of the group. In March 2025, following Öcalan’s appeal, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire with Türkiye. On May 12, it officially announced its intention to disband and end its armed struggle.

In July, thirty PKK militants symbolically destroyed their weapons in a ceremony in northern Iraq — a remarkable gesture after forty years of insurgency against Türkiye. Yet the question remains: does this moment mark the beginning of a genuine new era of peace between Turks and Kurds, particularly in Iraq, or is only the illusion of a reconciliation?


No sign of peace from Türkiye

Despite Öcalan’s call, Ankara has taken no reciprocal steps. The PKK founder remains imprisoned, serving a life sentence after 26 years behind bars. His continued detention — despite urging disarmament and reconciliation — raises serious concerns about Human rights and political will in Türkiye.

At the institutional level, the Turkish parliament formed a commission in August 2025 to oversee the peace process and ensure that the PKK’s disarmament is finalized by year’s end. One proposed measure is to reintegrate former PKK members who have not committed serious crimes by dropping charges of “membership in a terrorist organization.” However, no initiative so far includes Öcalan himself, and Ankara’s overall stance toward genuine reconciliation remains ambiguous.


Military operations continue in northern Iraq

Even as the PKK dissolved and surrendered its weapons, Turkish military operations have continued across northern Iraq, where PKK strongholds once existed.

On 16 August 2025, a drone strike near Iraq’s Sulaymaniyah killed one former PKK member and wounded another. In October, a Turkish drone bearing the inscription “Kemal Atatürk” crashed for unknown reasons in the Qandil region, with wreckage discovered near the village of Pirdeşal. Ankara remained silent about the incident — as it typically does regarding cross-border operations.

These events raise difficult questions: why does Türkiye continue targeting PKK-linked individuals if the group has officially disbanded? If Ankara does not honor its commitments, how can there be trust in the peace process?

And it seems that the pattern is unlikely to change soon. On 21 October 2025, the Turkish parliament voted to extend the government’s mandate for military operations in Iraq and Syria for another three years. While Ankara welcomed the PKK’s decision to lay down arms, it has offered few concrete steps in return — leaving the impression that the government may still view remnants of the PKK in Iraq as legitimate targets.


Energy and economic interests in the Iraqi Kurdistan

Energy considerations add another layer of complexity. 

In October 2025, Iraq resumed oil exports from the Kurdistan region through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline after a two-year suspension. The halt had stemmed from a dispute between Baghdad and Erbil, as Kurdish authorities sought to export oil independently through Türkiye’s Ceyhan port.


Following an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ruling in favor of Baghdad, Ankara suspended the exports. During the freeze, reports circulated that some oil was diverted through black-market routes, including via Iran — costing Ankara significant revenue.

Now that Baghdad and Erbil have reached an agreement, exports have resumed, offering much-needed financial relief to Türkiye. Ankara, meanwhile, is seeking compensation for its losses from the two-year suspension. It seems clear that Türkiye’s actions in northern Iraq are driven not only by security concerns but also by strategic energy and trade interests.


An unclear strategy

Despite the PKK’s disbandment and renewed oil cooperation between Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara, Türkiye’s broader strategy remains opaque. Continued military operations, the unresolved status of Abdullah Öcalan, and the absence of meaningful political or legal reforms all cast doubt on Ankara’s true intentions.

Rather than signaling a genuine commitment to reconciliation, Türkiye may be using the peace narrative to consolidate influence in northern Iraq — maintaining military pressure while securing economic and geopolitical gains.

Lasting peace or tactical pause? It will depend on Ankara’s willingness to translate military success onto political reconciliation. Without such steps, the so-called “new era” risks becoming yet another illusion of peace in the long and troubled history of the Türkiye–PKK conflict.

Labels:

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Relations between Türkiye and Latin America

by Martin Aslan Türkiye has established a real presence in regions such as Africa, especially in Libya and Somalia, as well as in Central Asia. Yet, one part of the world remains relatively under the radar in Turkish foreign policy: Latin America. Despite the geographical distance, it seems Ankara has been quietly working to expand its defense footprint in the region. Interestingly, the roots of Türkiye’s connection to Latin America stretch back to the 19th century, when immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, mostly Arabs, settled in South America. Locals called them "Los Turcos" (The Turks), a nickname that still stucks despite their actual ethnic origins. High-level visits and diplomatic expansion Türkiye launched an “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” in 1998. It was revised in 2006, when Türkiye declared that year as the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”. The plan served as a formal roadmap for engaging more seriously in the region. The first Turkish pr...
Post a Comment
Read more

What will be the next Turkish fighter aircraft?

by Martin Aslan Türkiye is struggling to find willing sellers for modern fighter jets. Ankara faces significant challenges in acquiring its next-generation combat aircraft and remains entangled in ongoing diplomatic disputes. The F-35 fallout Ankara originally intended to purchase 100 F-35 fighter jets from the United States beginning in 2002, when Türkiye joined the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program as a partner nation. Over the following years, it invested in the development and production phases of the aircraft. However, in a significant shift, Türkiye signed a deal with Russia in 2017 to acquire the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. The first deliveries of the S-400 system began in July 2019. This decision sparked concerns among NATO allies over interoperability and security, as the S-400 is not compatible with NATO defense infrastructure. As a result, Türkiye was officially removed from the F-35 program in July 2019. The move marked a turning point in Türkiye’s defense policy...
Post a Comment
Read more

Türkiye and Russia: Strategic Allies or Unavoidable Rivals?

  by Derya Introduction Defeated by Catherine the Second during the Russo-Ottoman War (1769-1774), which culminated in the signing of the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, the Ottoman Empire saw Crimea fall into Russian hands. The treaty granted Russia access to the Black Sea through Crimea, while Türkiye retained its command over the Mediterranean. Yet, centuries later, the delicate balance between these two powers remains fraught with contradictions. After the Bolshevik Revolution and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the newly formed Republic of Türkiye pursued a "good neighbor" policy with Russia. But how long could such a stance endure when just last week, President Erdoğan openly declared that he does not recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea? Türkiye’s geopolitical maneuvering has long been marked by strategic ambiguity. A NATO member since 1952, it has often tested the limits of the alliance, as seen in its controversial purchase of Russian S-400 missiles in 2019, despite ...
Post a Comment
Read more