Tũrkish Pulse

by Martin Aslan Democracy is deeply rooted in Armenia and has a long history. The current Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was one of the key architects of a political shift towards the West and the search for new partners, driven in particular by a desire to break free from Russia, which has historically tried to maintain a strong influence since 1991. Russia has lost its grip on the South Caucasus in recent years. Whilst Azerbaijan is increasingly proving to be a rival to Russia and Georgia has been caught up in a pro-European momentum for several years, Armenia constituted Moscow’s last foothold in what was considered its own backyard. Russia senses the tide turning and fears the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections to be held on 7 June.  Whilst Armenia is already facing disinformation campaigns, and political and economic pressure from Russia, which is seeking to sway Armenian public opinion in favor of pro-Russian candidates, the polls indicate that the incumbent Pr...

by Martin Aslan In the volatile geopolitics of March 2026, Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains the region's most destabilizing force—master of loud moral outrage and quiet strategic opportunism. The Azerbaijan-Israel axis perfectly exposes Ankara's hypocrisy. Azerbaijan supplies Israel with roughly 46% of its crude oil imports, flowing through Turkey's Ceyhan port via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In return, Israeli drones and advanced weaponry helped Baku decisively defeat Armenia in recent conflicts. This partnership directly counters Iran, providing Israel intelligence access near Tehran's borders and stoking fears of unrest among Iran's large ethnic Azeri population. Turkey vociferously backs Azerbaijan as “one nation, two states,” supplying political cover and military aid. Simultaneously, Erdoğan unleashes blistering anti-Israel rhetoric—especially over Gaza—imposing partial trade bans to rally domestic and Islamic support. Yet reality betrays the bl...

by Martin Aslan Both Erdoğan’s government and the Iranian regime perceive the Kurds as a threat. Estimates place their population between 7 and 15 million in Iran, Iranian Kurds—known as Rojhelati or Eastern Kurds—have faced ongoing discrimination, including restrictions on Kurdish language education, cultural expression, and political organizing. On February 22, 2026, five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) to coordinate efforts against the Islamic Republic. A sixth group, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, joined on March 4. The coalition includes: Such political coordination among Iranian Kurdish movements is likely to be closely watched in Ankara, where Kurdish political and territorial developments beyond Türkiye’s borders are viewed through a national security lens. If Iranian Kurdish parties were to gain territorial control in Iranian Kurdistan, it would likely heighten concerns in Ankara. Türkiye ha...

  by  Derya Vogel When the Saudi-Emirati rift over Yemen erupted into open conflict in late December 2025, Turkish pro-government voices could scarcely contain their delight. Commentators gleefully branded the UAE a reckless destabilizer, hurling accusations of covert Israeli collusion to fragment Arab states. They portrayed Abu Dhabi as isolated and humiliated, while touting Turkiye's "strategic depth" as ideally positioned to capitalize on the chaos. This was the classic Erdoğan media playbook: converting rivals' crises into Ankara's supposed victories. Official Ankara, however, played a cooler hand. The Foreign Ministry's measured December 26 statement praised both sides' "initiatives" for stability, pointedly highlighting Saudi "prudence" while sidestepping direct criticism of the UAE. This restraint preserved the fragile post-2021 economic thaw with Abu Dhabi—booming trade, high-level visits—despite the vitriol from aligned pundits...

by Martin Aslan Türkiye’s relationship with Asia is a dynamic blend of cultural, religious, and economic ties shaping Türkiye’s foreign policy and regional influence. These multifaceted connections reveal how cultural and religious bonds intersect with Türkiye’s paradoxical roles as both a peacemaker and arms supplier and raises questions about its real commitment in fighting fitna (division) within the Muslim world. This ambiguous position also raises questions about the effectiveness of Ankara’s influence. Cultural and religious connections Asia has long held historical and cultural importance for Türkiye. The Turkish people originally migrated from regions around present-day Mongolia, a heritage President Erdogan often recalls. This historical memory partly explains Türkiye’s continuing interest in the Uyghur people of China. While Ankara occasionally criticizes Beijing’s repression of Uyghurs, it offers little tangible support. Türkiye’s cultural resonance extends to South Asia, pa...

by Martin Aslan After decades of conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish government, a political “black swan” emerged in early 2025. Jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan issued a historic call for disarmament and the dissolution of the group. In March 2025, following Öcalan’s appeal, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire with Türkiye. On May 12, it officially announced its intention to disband and end its armed struggle. In July, thirty PKK militants symbolically destroyed their weapons in a ceremony in northern Iraq — a remarkable gesture after forty years of insurgency against Türkiye. Yet the question remains: does this moment mark the beginning of a genuine new era of peace between Turks and Kurds, particularly in Iraq, or is only the illusion of a reconciliation? No sign of peace from Türkiye Despite Öcalan’s call, Ankara has taken no reciprocal steps. The PKK founder remains imprisoned, serving a life sentence after 26 years behind bars. His continued d...

  by Martin Aslan Despite years of political clashes and stalled negotiations, Türkiye is quietly moving closer to Europe—but not in the way most might expect. What has prompted this shift, and what does it mean for both Türkiye and the European Union (EU)? The relationship between Türkiye and the EU has long been contentious, but recent developments over the past few months, suggest a shift in strategy that could reshape the future of European security and Türkiye’s role on the global stage. This article explores why Türkiye is pursuing closer ties with Europe, particularly in the area of defense industry, and what it hopes to gain from this change in approach. Indeed, this calculated rapprochement could lead European countries to become more dependent on the Turkish defense industry and, as a result, enhance Ankara’s influence over the EU. Türkiye and the EU: a candidacy in crisis Since Türkiye applied for EU membership in 1987 and gained official candidate status in 1999, it has...

by Martin Aslan Since the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a new wave of far-right Turkic solidarity has been rising amongst Turkish volunteers and lead to the creation of the Turan battalion. Their involvement, while not endorsed by any Ankara officials, highlights the complex dynamics of foreign volunteerism in the conflict and the rise of a renewed Panturkism, fueled by far-right ideology. The Turan Battalion: A Panturkic Initiative Established on November 20, 2022, the Turan Battalion is a unit of volunteers enlisting individuals from Turkic-speaking nations, including Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, amongst others. Founded by Aidos Sadyqov, a Kazakh opposition activist, the battalion is led by Almaz Kudabek Uulu, a Kyrgyz national who previously worked as a hairdresser in Kyiv. The name ‘Turan’ refers to the ancient mythical homeland of Turkic populations in Central Asia. The battalion embraces a Panturkist ideology that is dating back to ...

by Martin Aslan Türkiye is playing a dangerous diplomatic game with its Libyan partners and places itself in the middle of a potentially explosive situation. Türkiye-backed western Libya is in the edge of internal conflict due the tensions rising between armed groups related to the Government of National Unity (GNU). Instead of resolving this problem by diplomatic means, Türkiye is moving closer to the clan of Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which had previously opposed the GNU. Ankara appears to be attempting a change of alliance. This rapprochement is all the more hazardous because Marshal Haftar's presumed successor is his own son, General Saddam Haftar, who is particularly known for embezzling funds and violating human rights. While claiming to be dealing with Libya's fundamental problems in the general interest, Türkiye is actually driven by its economic ambitions. The benefits of a divided Libya Since the 2011 uprising during the Arab Spring, which culminated in the overthrow of ...

by Martin Aslan With the arrival in power in 2002 of the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a new strategy was put into place to enable Türkiye to develop its ties with Africa. The Gülen movement, an ally at the time, was the first non-governmental organization to invest massively in Africa. This opportunistic alliance enabled Türkiye to strengthen its influence on the continent. However, this alliance broke in 2013, leaving a very significant pro-Gülen imprint to the detriment of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 's power. Turkish soft power has been transformed and strengthened by TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), which became a state agency in 2018, and by the creation of the MAARIF foundation (a state-run organization focused on international education) in 2016. Numerous humanitarian NGOs gravitate around these two major organizations. The difference from before is that the government has now much tighter control over these institutions. TIKA, a multi-skilled state a...

by Martin Aslan Türkiye has established a real presence in regions such as Africa, especially in Libya and Somalia, as well as in Central Asia. Yet, one part of the world remains relatively under the radar in Turkish foreign policy: Latin America. Despite the geographical distance, it seems Ankara has been quietly working to expand its defense footprint in the region. Interestingly, the roots of Türkiye’s connection to Latin America stretch back to the 19th century, when immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, mostly Arabs, settled in South America. Locals called them "Los Turcos" (The Turks), a nickname that still stucks despite their actual ethnic origins. High-level visits and diplomatic expansion Türkiye launched an “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” in 1998. It was revised in 2006, when Türkiye declared that year as the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”. The plan served as a formal roadmap for engaging more seriously in the region. The first Turkish pr...

by Martin Aslan Türkiye is struggling to find willing sellers for modern fighter jets. Ankara faces significant challenges in acquiring its next-generation combat aircraft and remains entangled in ongoing diplomatic disputes. The F-35 fallout Ankara originally intended to purchase 100 F-35 fighter jets from the United States beginning in 2002, when Türkiye joined the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program as a partner nation. Over the following years, it invested in the development and production phases of the aircraft. However, in a significant shift, Türkiye signed a deal with Russia in 2017 to acquire the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. The first deliveries of the S-400 system began in July 2019. This decision sparked concerns among NATO allies over interoperability and security, as the S-400 is not compatible with NATO defense infrastructure. As a result, Türkiye was officially removed from the F-35 program in July 2019. The move marked a turning point in Türkiye’s defense policy...

By Derya Vogel Why would Central Asian nations—key members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—publicly challenge a Turkish-backed entity in the Mediterranean? At the EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on April 3–4, 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan made a surprising move: they endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, which reject the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a breakaway state recognized only by Türkiye. These resolutions reaffirm the Republic of Cyprus as the island’s sole legal government and call on all UN members not to recognize the TRNC or support its consolidation. To understand this shift, we must look back to 1974, when Cyprus was divided following a coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists aiming for unification with Greece. Türkiye responded by intervening militarily, leading to the island’s partition. The TRNC declared independence in 1983, but has remained diplomatically isolated. Türkiye, however, has consis...

by Martin Aslan Over the past two decades, Türkiye has undergone a significant transformation in its foreign policy, with the African continent emerging as a key strategic focus. Driven by a mix of economic ambition, diplomatic outreach, and geopolitical recalibration, Türkiye has steadily expanded its presence across Africa. This shift, which accelerated after Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2003, is reflected in the rapid increase in Turkish embassies, investment flows, and trade partnerships on the continent. While officials emphasize a “win-win” model of cooperation, critics argue that Türkiye’s engagement is guided more by resource acquisition and market access than by mutual development goals. Let’s not forget that Africa is a continent rich in natural resources, while Türkiye has very few (see the article “Africa, a continent with growing appeal”: https://turkishpulse.blogspot.com/2023/10/africa-continent-with-growing-appeal.html). This article examines the development of ...